- Recipient
- 0x15A6a5B190de7C3bf33abe7a81e0C0eE77dDf581
- Chain
- 4217
- Unit type
- not observed
- Session · description
- ip402 single GeoIP lookup
- Recipient
- not observed
- Chain
- not observed
- Unit type
- not observed
Paid IP geolocation and ASN lookup for agents. One IP in, normalized geolocation + network data out. Payment is the access control — no accounts, no API keys. Optional bundle: pay n x $0.01 once (?bundle=<n>, 2<=n<=100) and spend n lookups within 1 hour via SIWX (CAIP-122) signatures.
Payment surface
This count includes endpoints established by catalog, OpenAPI, or valid runtime 402 evidence. It does not count every URL the harmless scanner attempted.
Probe coverage
These are bounded unauthenticated requests and scanner-policy stops. A response without MPP evidence remains a discovery result, not a security failure.
5,654 response bytes · 0 redirects · HTTPS fetch completed with platform certificate validation
Oct 9, 2026, 12:22 PM UTC2,931 response bytes · 0 redirects · HTTPS fetch completed with platform certificate validation
Oct 2, 2026, 12:24 PM UTC2,931 response bytes · 0 redirects · HTTPS fetch completed with platform certificate validation
Oct 1, 2026, 12:24 PM UTC1,700 response bytes · 0 redirects · HTTPS fetch completed with platform certificate validation
Oct 1, 2026, 12:22 PM UTC5,654 response bytes · 0 redirects · HTTPS fetch completed with platform certificate validation
Sep 30, 2026, 6:19 PM UTC2,931 response bytes · 0 redirects · HTTPS fetch completed with platform certificate validation
Sep 23, 2026, 6:21 AM UTC2,931 response bytes · 0 redirects · HTTPS fetch completed with platform certificate validation
Sep 22, 2026, 12:19 PM UTC1,700 response bytes · 0 redirects · HTTPS fetch completed with platform certificate validation
Sep 22, 2026, 6:22 AM UTC5,654 response bytes · 0 redirects · HTTPS fetch completed with platform certificate validation
Sep 21, 2026, 6:20 PM UTC2,931 response bytes · 0 redirects · HTTPS fetch completed with platform certificate validation
Sep 14, 2026, 6:21 AM UTC2,931 response bytes · 0 redirects · HTTPS fetch completed with platform certificate validation
Sep 13, 2026, 12:17 PM UTC1,339 response bytes · 0 redirects · HTTPS fetch completed with platform certificate validation
Sep 13, 2026, 6:21 AM UTC5,623 response bytes · 0 redirects · HTTPS fetch completed with platform certificate validation
Sep 12, 2026, 6:18 PM UTCEvidence model
Every result names its evidence state. Unknown and not tested never mean secure.
Requires paid or state-changing behavior outside scanner scope
Basis: Tempo Aug 24 research class · Prior art: https://github.com/wevm/mppx/pull/510#discussion_r3377899233 · Oct 9, 2026, 12:22 PM UTC5654 bytes within scanner limit
Basis: harmless scanner · Oct 9, 2026, 12:22 PM UTCNo MPP Payment challenge observed
Basis: unauthenticated HTTP response · Oct 9, 2026, 12:22 PM UTCChannel and settlement lifecycle require credentials or payments
Basis: public economic-security prior art · Oct 9, 2026, 12:22 PM UTCConcurrency and paid state changes are prohibited
Basis: public economic-security prior art · Oct 9, 2026, 12:22 PM UTCScanner never sends credentials or payments
Basis: methodology · Prior art: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fxc9-7j2w-vx54 · Oct 9, 2026, 12:22 PM UTCNo current Payment challenge exposes session or authorization inputs
Basis: observable challenge values only · Oct 9, 2026, 12:22 PM UTCSignature and fee-payer relationships are not observable unauthenticated
Basis: public economic-security prior art · Oct 9, 2026, 12:22 PM UTCHTTPS fetch completed with platform certificate validation
Basis: platform TLS validation · Oct 9, 2026, 12:22 PM UTCScanner does not select, downgrade, or execute payment methods
Basis: public economic-security prior art · Oct 9, 2026, 12:22 PM UTC1 payment offer(s) accepted
Basis: harmless discovery response · Oct 9, 2026, 12:22 PM UTCRequires a completed paid interaction outside scanner scope
Basis: public economic-security prior art · Oct 9, 2026, 12:22 PM UTC0 redirects; every hop passed URL and DNS validation
Basis: harmless scanner · Oct 9, 2026, 12:22 PM UTCScanner never replays signed credentials
Basis: public advisory and protocol prior art · Prior art: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fxc9-7j2w-vx54 · Oct 9, 2026, 12:22 PM UTC1 hop(s) resolved twice to stable public addresses
Basis: scanner URL, DNS and redirect policy · Oct 9, 2026, 12:22 PM UTCRFC 9727 well-known path returned 200 text/html; charset=utf-8; no API catalog was established
Basis: RFC 9727 discovery response · Oct 2, 2026, 12:24 PM UTCRequires paid or state-changing behavior outside scanner scope
Basis: Tempo Aug 24 research class · Prior art: https://github.com/wevm/mppx/pull/510#discussion_r3377899233 · Oct 1, 2026, 12:24 PM UTC2931 bytes within scanner limit
Basis: harmless scanner · Oct 1, 2026, 12:24 PM UTCNo MPP Payment challenge observed
Basis: unauthenticated HTTP response · Oct 1, 2026, 12:24 PM UTCChannel and settlement lifecycle require credentials or payments
Basis: public economic-security prior art · Oct 1, 2026, 12:24 PM UTCConcurrency and paid state changes are prohibited
Basis: public economic-security prior art · Oct 1, 2026, 12:24 PM UTCScanner never sends credentials or payments
Basis: methodology · Prior art: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fxc9-7j2w-vx54 · Oct 1, 2026, 12:24 PM UTCNo current Payment challenge exposes session or authorization inputs
Basis: observable challenge values only · Oct 1, 2026, 12:24 PM UTCSignature and fee-payer relationships are not observable unauthenticated
Basis: public economic-security prior art · Oct 1, 2026, 12:24 PM UTCHTTPS fetch completed with platform certificate validation
Basis: platform TLS validation · Oct 1, 2026, 12:24 PM UTCScanner does not select, downgrade, or execute payment methods
Basis: public economic-security prior art · Oct 1, 2026, 12:24 PM UTCRequires a completed paid interaction outside scanner scope
Basis: public economic-security prior art · Oct 1, 2026, 12:24 PM UTC0 redirects; every hop passed URL and DNS validation
Basis: harmless scanner · Oct 1, 2026, 12:24 PM UTCScanner never replays signed credentials
Basis: public advisory and protocol prior art · Prior art: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fxc9-7j2w-vx54 · Oct 1, 2026, 12:24 PM UTC1 hop(s) resolved twice to stable public addresses
Basis: scanner URL, DNS and redirect policy · Oct 1, 2026, 12:24 PM UTCRequires paid or state-changing behavior outside scanner scope
Basis: Tempo Aug 24 research class · Prior art: https://github.com/wevm/mppx/pull/510#discussion_r3377899233 · Oct 1, 2026, 12:22 PM UTC1700 bytes within scanner limit
Basis: harmless scanner · Oct 1, 2026, 12:22 PM UTC1 Payment challenge(s) observed on HTTP 402; all required fields decoded and validated
Basis: unauthenticated HTTP response · Oct 1, 2026, 12:22 PM UTCChannel and settlement lifecycle require credentials or payments
Basis: public economic-security prior art · Oct 1, 2026, 12:22 PM UTCConcurrency and paid state changes are prohibited
Basis: public economic-security prior art · Oct 1, 2026, 12:22 PM UTCScanner never sends credentials or payments
Basis: methodology · Prior art: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fxc9-7j2w-vx54 · Oct 1, 2026, 12:22 PM UTC[{"method":"tempo","intent":"charge","deposit":null,"authorizationWindow":null,"depositWindowRatio":null,"observableAuthorizationExposure":null,"note":"unknown: session authorization inputs not observable"}]
Basis: observable challenge values only · Oct 1, 2026, 12:22 PM UTCSignature and fee-payer relationships are not observable unauthenticated
Basis: public economic-security prior art · Oct 1, 2026, 12:22 PM UTCHTTPS fetch completed with platform certificate validation
Basis: platform TLS validation · Oct 1, 2026, 12:22 PM UTCScanner does not select, downgrade, or execute payment methods
Basis: public economic-security prior art · Oct 1, 2026, 12:22 PM UTCRequires a completed paid interaction outside scanner scope
Basis: public economic-security prior art · Oct 1, 2026, 12:22 PM UTC0 redirects; every hop passed URL and DNS validation
Basis: harmless scanner · Oct 1, 2026, 12:22 PM UTCScanner never replays signed credentials
Basis: public advisory and protocol prior art · Prior art: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fxc9-7j2w-vx54 · Oct 1, 2026, 12:22 PM UTC1 hop(s) resolved twice to stable public addresses
Basis: scanner URL, DNS and redirect policy · Oct 1, 2026, 12:22 PM UTCHistory
security:bounded_response: {"state":"tested-pass","evidence":"2931 bytes within scanner limit","basis":"harmless scanner"} → {"state":"tested-pass","evidence":"5654 bytes within scanner limit","basis":"harmless scanner"}
Evidence: Repeated harmless observation changed the modeled property
security:bounded_response: {"state":"tested-pass","evidence":"5654 bytes within scanner limit","basis":"harmless scanner"} → {"state":"tested-pass","evidence":"2931 bytes within scanner limit","basis":"harmless scanner"}
Evidence: Repeated harmless observation changed the modeled property
security:bounded_response: {"state":"tested-pass","evidence":"2931 bytes within scanner limit","basis":"harmless scanner"} → {"state":"tested-pass","evidence":"5654 bytes within scanner limit","basis":"harmless scanner"}
Evidence: Repeated harmless observation changed the modeled property
security:bounded_response: {"state":"tested-pass","evidence":"5654 bytes within scanner limit","basis":"harmless scanner"} → {"state":"tested-pass","evidence":"2931 bytes within scanner limit","basis":"harmless scanner"}
Evidence: Repeated harmless observation changed the modeled property
security:bounded_response: {"state":"tested-pass","evidence":"1339 bytes within scanner limit","basis":"harmless scanner"} → {"state":"tested-pass","evidence":"1700 bytes within scanner limit","basis":"harmless scanner"}
Evidence: Repeated harmless observation changed the modeled property
security:bounded_response: {"state":"tested-pass","evidence":"2931 bytes within scanner limit","basis":"harmless scanner"} → {"state":"tested-pass","evidence":"5654 bytes within scanner limit","basis":"harmless scanner"}
Evidence: Repeated harmless observation changed the modeled property
security:bounded_response: {"state":"tested-pass","evidence":"5623 bytes within scanner limit","basis":"harmless scanner"} → {"state":"tested-pass","evidence":"2931 bytes within scanner limit","basis":"harmless scanner"}
Evidence: Repeated harmless observation changed the modeled property
security:bounded_response: {"state":"tested-pass","evidence":"2931 bytes within scanner limit","basis":"harmless scanner"} → {"state":"tested-pass","evidence":"5623 bytes within scanner limit","basis":"harmless scanner"}
Evidence: Repeated harmless observation changed the modeled property
security:bounded_response: {"state":"tested-pass","evidence":"5623 bytes within scanner limit","basis":"harmless scanner"} → {"state":"tested-pass","evidence":"2931 bytes within scanner limit","basis":"harmless scanner"}
Evidence: Repeated harmless observation changed the modeled property
security:api_catalog_parse: {"state":"tested-fail","evidence":"API catalog response was not valid JSON","basis":"RFC 9727 discovery response"} → {"state":"observed","evidence":"RFC 9727 well-known path returned 200 text/html; charset=utf-8; no API catalog was esta…
Evidence: Repeated harmless observation changed the modeled property
security:challenge_parse: {"state":"tested-pass","evidence":"1 Payment challenge(s) observed on HTTP 402","basis":"unauthenticated HTTP response"} → {"state":"tested-pass","evidence":"1 Payment challenge(s) observed on HTTP 402; all required fields decoded and validat…
Evidence: Repeated harmless observation changed the modeled property
security:bounded_response: {"state":"tested-pass","evidence":"2931 bytes within scanner limit","basis":"harmless scanner"} → {"state":"tested-pass","evidence":"5623 bytes within scanner limit","basis":"harmless scanner"}
Evidence: Repeated harmless observation changed the modeled property
security:bounded_response: {"state":"tested-pass","evidence":"5623 bytes within scanner limit","basis":"harmless scanner"} → {"state":"tested-pass","evidence":"2931 bytes within scanner limit","basis":"harmless scanner"}
Evidence: Repeated harmless observation changed the modeled property
security:bounded_response: {"state":"tested-pass","evidence":"2931 bytes within scanner limit","basis":"harmless scanner"} → {"state":"tested-pass","evidence":"5623 bytes within scanner limit","basis":"harmless scanner"}
Evidence: Repeated harmless observation changed the modeled property
security:bounded_response: {"state":"tested-pass","evidence":"5623 bytes within scanner limit","basis":"harmless scanner"} → {"state":"tested-pass","evidence":"2931 bytes within scanner limit","basis":"harmless scanner"}
Evidence: Repeated harmless observation changed the modeled property
tls_state: not-tested → tested-pass
Evidence: harmless unauthenticated HTTP observation
content_type → text/html; charset=utf-8
Evidence: harmless unauthenticated HTTP observation
implementation: unknown:0.0 → custom:0.35
Evidence: ["valid 402 Payment challenge observed without implementation-specific marker"]
tls_state: not-tested → tested-pass
Evidence: harmless unauthenticated HTTP observation